Abstract. We introduce a simplified framework for ord-transitive models and Shelah's non elementary proper (nep) theory. We also introduce a new construction for the countable support nep iteration.
Introduction
In this paper, we introduce a simplified, self contained framework for forcing with ordtransitive models and for non elementary proper (nep) forcing, and we provide a new construction for the countable support nep-iteration.
Judah and Shelah [IS88] introduced the notion "Suslin proper": A forcing notion Q ⊆ ω ω is Suslin proper if
• "p ∈ Q", "q ≤ p" and "q ⊥ p" (i.e., p and q are incompatible) are allΣ 1 1 statements (in some real parameter r), and if • for all contable transitive models M (of some ZFC * , a sufficiently large fragment of ZFC) that contain the parameter r and for all p ∈ Q M := Q ∩ M there is a q ≤ p which is M-generic, i.e., forces that the generic filter G meets every maximal antichain A ∈ M of Q M .
We always assume that H(χ) satisfies ZFC * (for sufficiently large regular cardinals χ). Then every Suslin proper forcing Q is proper. (Given an elementary submodel N of H(χ), apply the Suslin proper property to the transitive collapse of N.) So Suslin proper is a generalization of properness for nicely definable forcings.
Shelah [She04] introduced a generalization of Suslin proper which he called non elementary proper (nep). Actually, it is a generalization in two "dimensions":
(a) We do not require "p ∈ Q" etc. to be defined byΣ 1 1 statements, but rather by some arbitrary formulas that happen to be sufficiently (upwards) absolute. (b) We do not require M to be a transitive model, but rather a so-called ord-transitive model (and we allow more general parameters r). Why is (b) useful? To "approximate" a forcing notion Q by forcings Q M ∈ M, it is necessary that Q is the union of Q M for all possible models M. (This is of course the case if Q is Suslin proper: any p ∈ Q is a real, and therefore element of some countable transitive M and thus of Q M = Q ∩ M.) So if we allow only countable transitive models M, we can only talk about forcings Q that are subsets of H(ℵ 1 ). Of course there are many other interesting forcing notions, such as iterations of length ≥ ω 2 , products of size ≥ ℵ 2 , creature forcing constructions etc. Adopting ord-transitive models allows us to deal with some of these forcings as well.
The motivation for (a) is straightforward: This way, we can include forcing notions that are not Suslin proper (such as Sacks forcing), while we can still prove many of the results that hold for Suslin forcing notions.
To summarize:
• Just as Suslin proper, nep has consequences that are not satisfied by all proper forcing notions. So when we know that a forcing is nep and not just proper, we know more about its behavior. And while nep implies all of the useful consequences of Suslin proper, nep is more general (i.e., weaker): Some popular forcings are nep, but not Suslin proper (e.g., Sacks forcing). For example, let us say that "Q preserves non-meager" if Q forces that the ground model reals ar not meager (and analogously we define "Q preserves non-Lebesguenull). Goldstern and Shelah [She98, XVIII.3 .11] proved that the proper countable support iteration (P α , Q α ) of non-meager preserving forcing notions preserves non-meager, provided that all Q α are Suslin proper. Shelah and the author [KS05, 9.4 ] proved that the same preservation theorem holds for Lebesgue-null instead of meager and that it is sufficient to assume (nicely definable) nep instead of Suslin proper. This has been applied by Roslanowski and Shelah in [RS06] , which proves that consistently every real function is continuous on a set of positive outer Lebesgue measure. (The preservation theorem is applied to a forcing that is nep but not Suslin proper.) • In particular, forcings that are not subsets of H(ℵ 1 ) can be nep; for example big countable support products. In particular, we get a preservation theorem: under suitable assumptions, the countable support iteration of nep forcings is nep. An example of how this can be used is Lemma 4.24 of this paper. (This fact was used in [SS07, 4 .5] to investigate Abelian groups). Note that the Ord-transitive models mentioned in (b) above can be useful in a different (and simpler) setting as well: Instead of considering a forcing definition and the realizations Q V , Q M of this definition (in V or a countable model M, respectively), we can just use two arbitrary (and entirely different) forcings Q V ∈ V and Q M ∈ M and require that Q M is an M-complete subforcing of Q V . In the transitive case this concept has been a central ingredient of Shelah's oracle-cc [She98, IV] , and it can be applied to ord-transitive models as well. An example for such an application is the paper [GKSW] by Goldstern, Shelah, Wohofsky and the author, which proves the consistency of the Borel Conjecture plus the dual Borel Conjecture. For this construction, nep forcing is not required, just ord-transitive models. We very briefly comment on this in Section 1.3.
Contents.
Section 1, p. 2: We define ord-transitive ǫ-models M and their forcing extensions M [G] . Section 2, p. 8: We define the notion of non elementary proper forcing: Q is nep, if it is nicely definable and there are generic conditions for all countable models. If Q ⊆ 2 ω , then it is enough to consider transitive models; otherwise models such as in Section 1 are used. Section 3, p. 13: We mention some examples. Rule of thumb: every nicely definable forcing that can be shown to be proper is actually nep. We also give a very partial counterexample to this rule of thumb. Section 4, p. 22: We define (a simplified version of) the countable support iteration of nep forcings (such that the limit is again nep). Most of the notion and results in this paper are due to Shelah, and (most likely) can be found in [She04] , some of them explicitly (and sometimes in a more general setting), some at least "in spirit". However, the notation and many technical details are different: In many cases the notation here is radically simplified, in other cases the notions are just incomparable (for example the definition of nep-parameter). Most importantly, we work in standard set theory, not in a set theory with ordinals as urelements. The result of Subsection 3.5 is due to Zapletal.
Forcing with ord-transitive models
Whenever we use the notation N ≺ H(χ), we imply that N is countable, and that χ is a sufficiently large regular cardinal. We write H(χ) for the sets that are hereditarily smaller than χ and R α for the sets of rank less than α. (We will use the notation V α for forcings extension of P α , the α-th stage of some forcing iteration.) 1.1. Ord-transitive models. Let M be a countable set such that (M, ∈) satisfies ZFC * , a subset of ZFC. 1 We do not require M to be transitive or elementary. ON denotes the class of ordinals. We use ON M to denote the set of x ∈ M such that M thinks that x ∈ ON; similarly for other definable classes. This notation can formally be inconsistent with the following notation (but as usual we assume that the reader knows which variant is used): 2 For a definable set such as ω 1 , we use ω M 1 to denote the element x of M such that M thinks that x satisfies the according definition.
However, a few simple properties are absolute: In particular, if a formula ϕ(r) about real numbers is absolute for all transitive models, then is absolute for all ord-transitive models as well (which can easily be seen using the transitive collaps, cf. the following Fact 1.5). We now mention some of these absolute properties for ord-transitive models M:
• x ∈ ω ω is absolute; every Σ 1 1 formula is absolute; • "Finite sets" are absolute: z = {x, y} is absolute, if x ∈ M and x is finite, then
injective (or surjective), then f is injective (or surjective with respect to the new image).
• x ∈ R α is upwards absolute. If additionally x ON, then |x|≤|α| is upwards absolute. 1 We assume that ZFC * contains a sufficient part of ZFC, in particular extensionality, pairing, product, setdifference, emptyset, infinity and the existence of ω 1 .
2 If M is not transitive, then for example the set x = {α ∈ M : M α ∈ ω 1 } will generally be different from the element y ∈ M such that M y =∈ ω 1 . In that case x M. 3 "ϕ(x) is absolute" means M ϕ(m) iff V ϕ(m) for allm from M. Let i be the ord-collapse from an elementary submodel N to M. Set x = ω 1 , y = {{0}} and z = x ∪ y. Then x ∈ ON and z ON, so i(x) = x and i(z) is countable. Therefore i(x) ∪ i(y) i(z), and i(
• If either x ∈ ON, or x ∩ ON = ∅, then y ⊂ x is absolute.
Instead of ord-transitive models, we could equivalently use transitive models with an (ordinal) labeling on the ordinals: Definition 1.4. A labeled model is a pair (M, f ) consisting of a transitive, countable ZFC * model M and a strictly monotonic function f :
By induction, one can prove the following:
We say that the ord-transitive model M and the labeled model (
. So each ord-transitive model corresponds to exactly one labeled model and vice versa.
This also shows that is easy to create "weird" ord-transitive models; in particular "α is successor ordinal" and similarly simple formulas are generally not absolute for ordtransitive models. We will generally not be interested in such weird models: Definition 1.6. Let M be ord-transitive.
• M is "successor-absolute", if "α is successor" and "α = β + 1" both are absolute between M and V.
• A successor-absolute M is cf ω-absolute, if "cf(α) = ω" and "A is a countable cofinal subset of α" both are absolute between M and V. Fact 1.7. If M is cf ω-absolute and M thinks that x is countable, then x ⊂ M.
Proof. If x ON, then x ⊆ M. So assume towards a contradiction that x ∈ ON is minimal with x M (and x < ω M 1 ). M thinks that y := x \ {0} (constructed in M) is countable and cofinal in x. Since y ON we know y ⊂ M, so x = α∈y α is a subset of M, since x was the minimal counterexample.)
M is successor-absolute iff the corresponding labeled model (M ′ , f ′ ) satisfies: f (α+1) = f (α) + 1 and f (δ) is a limit ordinal for all limit ordinals δ. Remark 1.8.
• We will see in the next section how to construct forcing extensions for ord-transitive models M, or equivalently labeled models (M ′ , f ′ ): If G is Mgeneric, and G ′ the image under the transitive collapse (which will be M ′ -generic), then the forcing extension M[G] is just the ord-transitive model corresponding to
. Such forcing extensions are the most important "source" for ordtransitive models that are not just (the ord-transitive collapse of) an elementary model.
• In applications, we typically have to deal with ord-transitive models that are internal forcing extensions of elementary models (i.e., in the construction above G is in V and M is the ord-collapse of N ≺ H(χ)).
• All such ord-transitive models are ord-absolute (and satisfy many additional absoluteness properties). So for applications, it is enough to only consider ord-absolute models, and restrictions of this kind sometimes make notation easier.
• Ord-collapses M of elementary submodels are cf ω-absolute. In some applications (such as the the preservation theorem mentioned in the introduction) it is essential to use such collapses, therefore we cannot restrict ourselves to cf ω-absolute models. However, for some other applications, cf ω-absolute models are sufficient (e.g., for the application mentioned in Section 1.3).
Every ord-transitive model is hereditarily countable modulo ordinals: Definition 1.9.
• We define ord-clos by induction: ord-clos(x) = x∪ {ord-clos(t) :
For example, if α > ω 1 , then ω 1 is element of hco(α), but ω 1 ∪ {{∅}} or ω 1 \ {∅} are not.
Facts 1.10.
• ord-clos(M) is the smallest ord-transitive superset of M.
• If M is ord-transitive and countable, then M ∈ hco.
• If M is ord-transitive and x ∈ M, then ord-clos(x) = ord-clos
• "x ∈ hco(α)" is upwards absolute for ord-transitive models.
As already mentioned, there is an ord-transitive model M such that ω
is not just element of hco (which is true in V as well), but that it can also be constructed as countable set (which is false in V).
Forcing extensions.
Forcing still works for ord-transitive models (but the evaluation of names has to be modified in the natural way). In the following, M always denotes an ord-transitive model. Definition 1.11. Let M think that ≤ is a partial order on P. So in V, ≤ is a partial order on
To simplify notation, we will use the following assumption: Assumption 1.12. P ∩ ON is empty. (Then in particular P ⊆ M, and we can write
In Definition 1.11 we do not assume G ⊆ P. This slightly simplifies notation later on. Obviously G is M-generic iff G ∩ P is M-generic. One could equivalently use maximal antichains, predense sets, or open dense sets instead of dense sets in the definition (and one can omit the "filter" part if one requires that a maximal antichain A in M meets the filter G in exactly one point).
Let labeledcoll(M) = (M ′ , f ′ ) be the labeled model corresponding to M, via the transitive collapse j. Let G ⊆ P and set P ′ := j(P) and
In that case we can form the forcing extension M ′ [G ′ ] in the usual way, and define
be the transitive collapse, and I its inverse, then we can defineτ [ 
Elementarity shows that this is a "reasonable" forcing extension.
We now describe this extension in more detail and using the ord-transitive model M more directly:
Basic forcing theory shows: If M is a transitive model, P ∈ M, and G a P-generic filter over M, then we can define the evaluation of names by
and M[G] will be a (transitive) forcing extension of M.
This evaluation of names works for elementary submodels as well, provided that G is not only N-, but also V-generic. More exactly: If N ≺ H(χ) contains P, and if G is N-and V-generic, then N[G] is a forcing extension of N (and in particular end-extension). Here it is essential that G is V-generic as well:
This can be summarized as follows:
In the transitive case M[G] is transitive; and in the elementary submodel case, we get:
• Forcing extension commutes with transitive collapse: Let i be the transitive collapse of M, and
If one considers general ord-transitive candidates M (i.e., M is neither transitive nor an elementary submodel), then Definition (1.1) does not work any more. For example, if M is countable and thinks thatτ is a standard name for the ordinal ω Definition 1.14. Let G be P-generic over M, and let M think thatτ is a P-name.
(Note that being a P-name is absolute.) We usually just writeτ[G] instead ofτ [G] M . There should be no confusion which notion of evaluation we mean, 1.14 or (1.1), which we can also write asτ [G] V : 
Moreover, the transitive collapse commutes with the forcing extension:
(The proof is a straightforward induction.) So forcing extensions of ord-transitive models behave just like the usual extensions. For example, we immediately get:
• M is ord-transitive.
• G is M-generic, and
The last item means that we get the same value forτ
N will generally not be an interesting or meaningful object.)
Let us come back once more to the proper case. By induction on the rank of the names we get that the ord-collapse and forcing extension commute: Lemma 1.19. Assume that N ≺ H(χ), and P ∈ N. Let i : N → M be the ord-collapse.
•
G ⊆ P is N-generic iff i[G] is M-generic. • Assume that G is N-and V-generic. Then the ord-collapse I of N[G] extends i, and I(τ[G]) = (i(τ))[i[G]].
• If P ⊆ hco, then i is the identity on P.
M-complete subforcings.
In the rest of the paper, we will use ord-transitive models in the context of definable proper forcings (similar to Suslin proper). But first let us briefly describe another, simpler, setting in which ord-transitive models can be used.
Let M be a countable transitive model and
M is a maximal antichain in Q as well. So there are two differences to the "proper" setting: Q M and Q do not have to be defined by the same formula, 7 and we do not just require that below every condition in Q M we find a Q M -generic condition in Q, but that already the empty condition is Q M -generic.
8
For transitive models, this concept has been used for a long time. It is, e.g., central to Shelah's oracle-cc [She98, IV] . In oracle-cc forcing, one typically constructs a forcing 7 They do not have to be nicely definable at all, and furthermore Q M and Q can be entirely different: E.g., Q M could be Cohen forcing in M and Q could be (equivalent to) random forcing in V. 8 In the proper case, this is equivalent to "Q is ccc".
notion Q of size ℵ 1 as follows: Construct (by induction on α ∈ ω 1 ) an increasing (noncontinuous) sequence of countable transitive models M α (we can assume that M α knows that α is countable), and forcing notions Q α ∈ M α such that Q δ = β<δ Q β for limits δ and such that Q β+1 is an M β -complete superforcing of Q β . (Then each Q α will be M α -complete subforcing of the final Q.) So we use the pair (M α , Q α ) as an approximation to the final forcing notion Q. Since we use transitive models, this Q has to be subset of H(ℵ 1 ).
If we want to investigate other forcings, we can try to use ord-transitive models instead. For example, in [GKSW] we use a forcing iterationP = (P α , Q α ) α≤ω 2 (where each Q α consists of conditions in H(ℵ 1 )), and we "approximate"P by pairs (M x ,P x ), where M x is a countable ord-transitive model and M x thinks thatP x is a forcing iteration of length ω V 2 . Instead of assuming that P x ω 2 is a subforcing of P ω 2 , it is more natural to assume (inductively) that each P x α can be canonically (and in particular M x -completely) embedded into P α , and that
We show that givenP x in a countable ord-transitive model M x we can find variants of the finite suppost and the countable support iterationsP such thatP
x canonically embeds intoP (and we show that some preservation theorems that are known for proper countable support iterations also hold for this variant of countable support). For this application it is enough to consider cf ω-absolute models.
In the current paper, we do something very similar (in the nep setting, i.e., the definable/proper framework), in Sections 4.1 and 4.3. Let us again stress the obvious difference:
In the nep case, we use definable forcings, and
, and we just get that below (the canonical image of) each p ∈ P x α there is some M x -generic q ∈ P α . In particular, the application of non-wellfounded models in [GKSW] does not use any of the concepts that are introduced in the rest of this paper.
Nep forcing
2.1. Candidates. We now turn our attention to definable forcings. More particularly, we will require that for all suitable (ord-transitive) models M, "x ∈ Q" is upward absolute between M and V.
9 Also, we will require that for all x ∈ Q there is a model M knowing that x ∈ Q. This is only possible if Q ⊂ hco (since every countable ord-transitive model is hereditarily countable modulo ordinals), but it is not required that Q ⊆ H(ℵ 1 ) (as it is the case when using countable transitive models only).
It is natural to allow parameters other than just reals. The following is a simple example of a definable iteration using a function p : ω 1 → 2 as parameter: (P β , Q β ) β<ω 1 is the countable support iteration such that Q β is Miller forcing if p(β) = 0 and random forcing if p(β) = 1.
Once we use such a parameter p, we of course cannot assume that p is in the model M (since M is countable and ord-transitive). Instead, we will assume that M contains its own version p M of the parameter; in our example we would require that δ := ω
More generally we define "p is a nep parameter" by induction on the rank: ∅ is a nepparameter, and Definition 2.1. p is a nep-parameter, if p is a function with domain β ∈ ON and p(α) is a nep-parameter for all α ∈ β.
9 There are useful notions similar to nep without this property. Examples for such forcings appear naturally when iterating nep forcings, cf. Subsection 4.1.
In other words: A nep-parameter is just an arbitrary set together with a hereditary wellorder.
If M contains p M , then M thinks that p M is a nep-parameter (and if β = dom(p), then β ∈ M and M thinks β = dom(p M )).
We can canonically code a real r, an ordinal, or a subset of the ordinals as a nepparameter.
Definition 2.2. Let p be a nep-parameter. M is a (ZFC * , p)-candidate, if M is a countable, ord-transitive, successor absolute model of ZFC * and contains p M , the M-version of p.
We can require many additional absoluteness conditions for candidates, e.g., the absoluteness of the canonical coding of α × α, or cf ω-absoluteness. The more conditions we require, the less candidates we will get, i.e., the weaker the properness notion "for all candidates, there is a generic condition" is going to be. In practice however, these distinctions do not seem to matter: All nep forcings will satisfy the (stronger) official definition, and for all applications weaker versions suffices.
To be more specific: Most applications will only use properness for candidates M that satisfy
M is an internal forcing extension of an elementary submodel N.
More exactly: We start with
M is an elementary submodel in a P-extension, for a σ-complete P.
More exactly: Let P be σ-complete, pick in the
(χ) and let N ′ be the ord-collapse. Then N ′ is in V (and an ord-transitive model). Of course all these models satisfy a variety of absoluteness properties (such as the canonical coding of α × α etc). So for all applications, it would be enough to consider candidates that satisfy (2.1) (or some exotic application might need (2.2)), but we we do not make the properties (2.1) or (2.2) part of the official definition of "candidate", since both properties are much more complicated (and less absolute) than just "M is a countable, ord-transitive ZFC * -model". Note however that generally we can not assume that the P used in (2.1) is proper or even just ω 1 -preserving. For example in the application in [KS05] , we need P to be a collapse of ℵ 1 . So in particular we can not assume that all candidates are cf ω-absolutene.
We will only be interested in the normal case:
Sometimes we will assume that ZFC * is element of a candidate M. This allows us to formulate, e.g., "M thinks that M ′ is a candidate". We can guarantee this by choosing ZFC * recursive, or by coding it into p. 
Lemma 2.4. (1) (Assuming normality.) If N ≺ H(χ) contains p, and (M, p M ) is the ord-collapse of (N, p), then M is candidate and p M is the M-version of p. (2) The statements "p M is the M-version of p" is absolute between transitive universes. If p M is the M-version of p, and M thinks that M ′ is ord-transitive and that
p M ′ is the M ′ -version of p M , then p M ′ is the M ′ -version of p. (3) If M[G]
Lemma 2.6. Assume that
• S is a set of sentences in the first order language using the relation symbol ∈ and the constant symbols c x , c p ,
Proof. We call such a candidate a good candidate. So we have to show:
Just as in the proof of Shoenfield absoluteness, we will show that a good candidate M corresponds to an infinite descending chain in a partial order T defined in L ′ . (Each node of T is a finite approximation to M). Then we use that the existence of such a chain is absolute.
We define for a nep-parameter y
Also in L ′ , we fix some δ ≥ ω V 1 bigger than every ordinal in {x} ∪ trans-clos(x) and bigger than dom(y) for every y ∈ f-clos(p) ∪ {p}.
We can assume that S contains ZFC * as well as the sentence "c p is a nep-parameter". We use (in L ′ ) the following fact:
Let S be a theory of the countable (first-order) language L S . Then there is a theory S ′ (of a countable language L S ′ ⊃ L S ) such that the deductive closure of S ′ is a conservative extension of S , and every sentence in S ′ has the form (∀x 1 )(∀x 2 ) . . . (∀x n )(∃y) ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n , y) for some quantifier free formula ψ (using new relation symbols of S ′ ).
So we fix S ′ and L ′ , consisting of relation symbols R i (i ∈ ω) of arity r i ≥ 1, and constant symbols c i (i ∈ ω). We can assume that there are constant symbols for ω and for each natural number. We can further assume
expresses "x is a function and dom(x) = y",
We set
We now define the partial order T as follows: A node t ∈ T consists of the natural number n t , the sequences (c 
We set t ≥ T t ′ if
• n t ′ ≥ n t , and all the interpretations and functions in t ′ are extensions of the ones in t. (So we will omit the indices t and t ′ .)
Then we get the following:
• T is a partial order.
• The definition of T can be spelled out in L ′ , the definition is absolute, and every node of T is element of
• T has an infinite descending chain iff there is a good candidate. Let us show just the last item: Clearly, a suitable candidate defines an infinite descending chain: Given M, we can extend it to an S ′ -model (since S ′ is a conservative extension of S ) and find a rank function rk for M. Then we can construct a chain as a subset of those nodes t ∈ T that correspond to finite subsets of M: To every such t we just have to put enough elements into t ′ to witness the requirements. On the other hand, a chain defines a candidate: The union of the structures in the chain is a L ′ -structure M ′ and an S ′ -model. The function rk defines a rank on M ′ . So we can define by induction on this rank a function i : M ′ → V the following way:
, that M is the required good candidate.
Remark 2.7.
• If p is a real, then the transitive collapse of a candidate still is a candidate. So if x is a real and S as above, the existence of an appropriate candidate is equivalent to the existence of a transitive candidate, which is aΣ 1 2 statement (in the parameters p, x, S ).
• There is also a notion of non-wellfounded non elementary (nw-nep) (q, p, p M ) . Additionally we require that these formulas are upwards absolute. To summarize:
Definition 2.8.
• M 1 is a candidate in M 2 means the following: M 1 is a candidate, M 2 is either a candidate or M 2 = V, M 1 ∈ M 2 , and M 2 knows that M 1 is countable.
In V and all (ZFC * , p)-candidates M, ϕ ∈Q defines a set and ϕ ≤Q defines a semi partial order on this set, and ϕ ∈Q and ϕ ≤Q are upwards absolute for candidates.
As usual, we define:
Recall that "G is M-generic" is defined in 1.11. Of course, G Q will generally not be a subset of Q M . Note that "p ∈ Q", "q ≤ p" and therefore "p q" are upward absolute, but ⊥ is not. (It will be absolute in most simple examples of nep-forcing, but typically not in nep-iterations or similar constructions using nep forcings as building blocks). This effect is specific for nep forcing, it appears neither in proper forcing (since for N ≺ H(χ), incompatibility always is absolute), nor in Suslin proper (since the absoluteness of incompatibility is part of the definition).
Since ⊥ is not absolute, "q is M-generic" is generally not equivalent to "q forces that all Sometimes we will denote the p and ZFC * belonging to Q by p Q and ZFC * Q and denote a (ZFC * Q , p Q )-candidate by "Q-candidate". We will only be interested in normal forcings:
• ZFC * is normal (cf. 2.3), • Q ⊆ hco in V and in all candidates (cf. 1.9), • "p ∈ Q" and "q ≤ p" are absolute between V and H(χ) (for sufficiently large regular χ).
If ZFC * is normal, then the ord-collapse collapse of any N ≺ H(χ) containing p is a candidate. So we get:
Lemma 2.12. If Q is normal, then for any p ∈ Q there is a candidate M such that q ∈ Q M . If Q is normal and nep, then Q is proper.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 2.4 (and the fact that in the definition of proper one can assume that the elementary submodels contain an arbitrary fixed parameter, see e.g. [Gol93, Def. 3.7]).
As already mentioned, we are only interested in normal forcings, and we will later tacitly assume normality whenever we say a forcing is nep. The basic theorem of forcing can be formulated as: For a transitive countable model M and
(And there always is at least one M-generic filter G ∈ V containing p.) By 1.17 we get the following:
If M is a countable, ord-transitive model and P ∈ M, then (2.6) holds.
With the usual abuse of notation, the essential property of proper forcing can be formulated as follows: If M is an elementary submodel of H(χ) and Q in M is proper, then
) for every M-and V-generic filter G containing p .
(And there always is at least one M-and V-generic filter containing p.) For nep forcings we get exactly the same:
(2.9) If Q is nep and M a Q-candidate, then (2.8) holds.
If M 1 is a candidate in M 2 , and q is Q-generic over M 1 , then q does not have to be generic over M 2 (since M 2 can see more dense sets). Of course, the other direction also fails: If q is M 2 -generic, then generally it is not M 1 -generic (corresponding to the fact in non-ccc proper forcing that not every V-generic filter has to be N-generic): M 1 could think that D is predense, but M 2 could know that D is not, or M 1 could think that p 1 ⊥ p 2 , but M 2 sees that p 1 p 2 . Even for very simple Q satisfying that ⊥ is absolute "{p i : i ∈ ω} is a maximal antichain" need not be upwards absolute (in contrast to Suslin proper forcing, see example 3.10).
Examples
There are oodles of examples nep forcings. Actually:
Rule of Thumb 3.1. Every nicely definable forcing notion that can be proven to be proper is actually nep.
This rule does not seem to be quite true. A very partial potential counterexample is 3.17. However, the rule seems to hold in most cases, and becomes even truer if the proof of properness uses some form of pure decision and fusion, e.g., for σ-closed or Axiom A. (And in these cases, the proof of the nep property is just a trivial modification of the proof of properness.)
Overview of this section:
• Typically, the creatures are finite and the basic creature forcing consist of ω-sequences (or similar hereditarily countable objects made) of creatures. The proofs that such forcings are proper actually give nep. We demonstrate this effect on a specific example (that will also be used in Subsection 3.5). This specific example is in fact Suslin proper, but other simple (and similarly defined) creature forcing notions are nep but not Suslin proper.
We fix a sufficiently fast growing 11 function F : ω → ω and set
Definition 3.4. An i-creature is a function φ : P(a) → ω such that • a ⊆ F(i) is nonempty.
10 More specifically, the straightforward proof shows that in this case "Q is nep" -i.e. "nep with respect to all ord-transitive models" -is equivalent to: "Q is nep with respect to all transitive models". 11 It is enough to assume
• φ is monotonic, i.e., b ⊂ c ⊆ a implies φ(b) ≤ φ(c).
• φ has bigness, i.e., φ(b ∪ c) ≤ max(φ(b), φ(c)) + 1 for all b, c ⊆ a.
• φ(∅) = 0 and φ({x}) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ a. We set val(φ) ≔ a, nor(φ) ≔ φ(a), and we call φ 1 stronger than φ 0 , or: φ 1 ≤ φ 0 , if val(φ 1 ) ⊆ val(φ 0 ) and φ 1 (b) ≤ φ 0 (b) for all b ⊆ val(φ 1 ).
For every φ and x ∈ val(φ) there is a stronger creature φ ′ with domain {x}. For each i, there are only finitely many i-creatures.
Another way to write bigness is:
Given a p ∈ P, we can define the trunk of p as follows: Let l be maximal such that val(p(i)) is a singleton {x i } for all i < l. Then the trunk is the sequence (x i ) i<l .
We define the P-nameη to be the union of all trunks of conditions in the generic filter. For every n, the set of conditions with trunk of length at least n is (open) dense. If q ≤ p then the trunk of q extends the trunk of p. Soη is the name of a real, more specificallỹ η ∈ i∈ω F(i).
P is nonempty: For example, the following is a valid condition: val(p(n)) = F(n), and p(n)(b) = ⌊log 2 (|b|)⌋.
Lemma 3.6. P satisfies fusion and pure decision, so P is ω ω -bounding and nep (and in particular proper).
Sketch of proof. This is an simple case of [RS06, 2.2]. We give an overview of the proof, which uses the creature-forcing concepts of bigness and halving:
Bigness: Assume that φ is an i-creature with nor(φ) > 1, and that F : val(φ) → 2. Then there is a ψ ≤ φ such that nor(ψ) ≥ nor(φ) − 1 and such that F ↾ val(ψ) is constant.
(This follows immediately from (3.2).) Halving: Let φ be an i-creature. Then there is an i-creature half(φ) ≤ φ such that • nor(half(φ)) ≥ ⌈nor(φ)/2⌉.
• If ψ ≤ half(φ) and nor(ψ) > 0, then there is a ψ ′ ≤ φ such that nor(ψ ′ ) ≥ ⌈nor(φ)/2⌉ and val(ψ ′ ) ⊆ val(ψ).
(Proof: Define half(φ) by val(half(φ)) = val(φ) and half(φ)(b) = max(0, φ(b) − ⌊nor(φ)/2⌋). Given ψ as above, we set b := val(ψ) and define ψ ′ by val(ψ
Set pos(p, n) = i<n val(p(n)). For s ∈ pos(p, n), we construct p ∧ s ≤ p by enlarging the stem of p to be s (or, if the stem was larger than n to begin with, then the stem extends s and we set p ∧ s = p). The set {p ∧ s : s ∈ pos(p, n)} is predense under p. Let D be an open dense set. We say that p essentially is in D, if there is an n ∈ ω such that p ∧ s ∈ D for all s ∈ pos(p, n).
Pure decision: For p ∈ P, n ∈ ω and D ⊆ P open dense there is a q ≤ n p essentially in D.
Then the rest follows by a standard argument: Nep: Note that p ∈ P and q ≤ p and q ≤ k p are Borel (so p ⊥ q is absolute; actually ⊥ is Borel as well, i.e., P is Suslin proper 
Continuous reading of names and therefore ω ω -bounding follows equally easily. It remains to show pure decision. Fix p, n and D and set p 0 = p. Given p m , we construct p m+1 as follows:
• Choose
• Enumerate pos(p m ) as
, according to (3.1).
Let p ω be the limit of all the p m . For every n ∈ ω define by downward induction on h = n, n − 1, . . . , h 0 the h-creatures φ n,h and sets Λ n,h ⊆ pos(p ω , h) in the following way:
• Λ n,n is the set of s ∈ pos(p ω , n) such that p ω ∧ s is essentially in D.
• Assume h 0 ≤ h < n. So for all s ∈ pos(p ω , h) some of the extensions in of s to pos(p ω , h + 1) will be in Λ n,h+1 while others will be not. By shrinking p ω (h) at most k * h many times, each time using bigness, we can guarantee that the resulting h-creature φ n,h satisfies: For all s ∈ pos(p ω , h) either all extension compatible with φ n,h are in Λ n,h+1 or no extension is. Set Λ n,h to be the set of those s such that the extensions all are in Λ n,h+1 . Note that
For each h, there are only finitely many possibilities for Λ n,h and φ n,h , so using König's lemma, we can get a sequence (φ * ,h , Λ * ,h ) h 0 ≤h<ω such that for all N there is an n > N such that
We claim
Then we choose any n such that Λ n,h 0 = Λ * ,h 0 and define q by
Then q essentially is in D, according to (3.5) and the definition of Λ n,h . So it remains to show (3.5). Assume towards a contradiction that s ∈ pos(p ω ) \ Λ * ,h 0 . Let q ′ be the condition with stem s and the creatures (φ * ,h ) h 0 ≤h<ω . Pick some r ≤ q ′ in D. Let s ′ be the trunk of r. So s ′ extends s. Let h be the length of s ′ . Without loss of generality, we can assume that (3.6) k * l nor(r(l)) > 2 for all l ≥ h and that h = h m for some m, where h m is the number picked in (3.3) to construct p m+1 . In particular, s ′ = s k for some k, so
We know that r ∈ D. This implies that
k . Then the condition consisting of trunk s ′ , the creaturesr(l) for h m ≤ l < H and r(l) for l ≥ H would be a suitable condition for the deciding case, a contradiction to the fact that we are in the halving case. This shows (3.8).
Note
We can now derive the desired contradiction:
Proof: Assume otherwise, i.e., for some N every s N as in (3.4) . Then according to the definition of Λ n,h , we get s ′ ∈ Λ n,h m and therefore s ∈ Λ n,h 0 , a contradiction. This shows (3.9).
3.3. σ-closed forcing notions. The simplest (and not very interesting) examples of nontransitive nep-forcings are the σ-closed ones. We use the following obvious fact:
Fact 3.7. Assume that Q is upwards absolutely defined, that ⊥ is upwards absolute as well (and therefore absolute) and that Q is σ-closed (in V). Then Q is nep.
It is not enough to assume that Q is ccc (in V and all candidates) instead of σ-closed, see Example 3.17.
So the following definition of Q = { f : ω 1 → ω 1 partial, countable} is nep:
Note that we cannot use ω 1 in the definition directly, since there are candidates M such that ω M 1 > ω V 1 . Neither could we use f : α → p, α ∈ p, since such an f in a candidate M really has domain α ∩ M, which is generally not an ordinal (i.e., this definition would not be upwards absolute).
More generally, we can get the examples:
Example 3.9. Assume that p codes the ordinals κ p and λ p , and set
This example shows that a nep forcing can look completely different in different candidates: Assume κ p = ω 1 and λ p = ω 2 . So in V, Q collapses ω 2 to ω 1 . Let N ≺ H(χ), M = ord-col(N), and M 0 ∈ V a forcing-extension of M for the collapse of ω 1 to ω. Then M 0 is a candidate, and M 0 thinks that ω V 1 is countable, so Q is trivial in M 0 . If M 1 ∈ V is a forcing-extension of M for the collapse of ω 2 to ω 1 , then in M 1 Q is isomorphic to the set of countable partial functions from ω 1 to ω 1 .
A slight variation (still σ-closed):
Example 3.10. Set p = ω 1 , Q = { f : p → L∩2 ω partial, countable} (ordered by extension). Then Q is nep, and there is a candidate M which thinks that A is a countable maximal antichain of Q M , but A is not maximal in V.
Proof. x ∈ L is upwards absolute, so ∈ Q , ≤ Q and ⊥ Q are upwards absolute.
Another, trivial example for a countable antichain with non-absolute maximality is the (trivial) forcing defined by
3.4. Non-transitive creature forcing. Some creature forcing constructions use a countable support product (or a similar construction) built from basic creature forcings. In the useful cases these forcings can be shown to be proper, and the proof usually also shows nep. One would take the index set of the product to be an ordinal κ, and choose the nep parameter p with domain κ such that p(α) is the nep-parameter (a real) for the basic creature forcings Q α . To give the simplest possible example:
Lemma 3.11. The countable support product (of any size) of Sacks forcings is nep.
Proof. Again, the standard proof of properness works. First some notation: A splitting node is a node that has two immediate successors. The n-th splitting front F T n of a perfect tree T ⊆ 2 <ω is the set of splitting nodes t ∈ T such that t has exactly n splitting nodes below it. Note that F T n is a front (i.e., it meets every branch) and therefore finite (since T has finite splitting). Let κ be the index set of the product. So a condition p consists of a countable domain dom(p) ⊆ κ and for every i ∈ dom(p) a perfect tree p(i). In particular, q ≤ p means dom(q) ⊇ dom(p) and q(i) ⊆ p(i) for all i ∈ dom(p).
• For u ⊆ κ finite, q ≤ n,u p means: q ≤ p, and F
n for all i ∈ u.
• Fusion: If we use some simple bookkeeping, we can guarantee that a sequence p n+1 ≤ n,u n p n has a limit p ω . (It is enough to make sure that the u n are increasing and that n∈ω u n covers dom(p ω ).)
(a finite set). For η ∈ pos u (p, n) there is a canonical p ∧ η ≤ p defined in the obvious way (we increase some trunks).
• Pure decision: given a condition p, some finite u ⊆ dom(p), some n ∈ ω and an open dense set D, we can strengthen p to some q ≤ n,u p such that q ∧ η ∈ D for all η ∈ pos u (q, n).
To show this, just enumerate pos u (q, n + 1) as ν 0 , . . . , ν M−1 , set p 0 = p, given p m find p ′ ≤ p ∧ ν m in D and then set p m+1 to be p ′ "above ν m " and p m "on the parts incompatible with ν m ". Then set q = p M .
• This implies nep: Let the forcing parameter p code κ (e.g., p : κ → {0}). Then we can define P to consist of all countable partial functions p with domain dom(p) such that p(α) is a perfect tree for all α ∈ dom(p). This is an absolute definition, and compatibility is absolute.
• With similar standard arguments we get ω ω -bounding.
3.5. Idealized forcing. Zapletal [Zap08] developed the theory of (proper) forcing notions of the form P I = Borel/I for (definable) ideals I. (A smaller set is a stronger condition.) The generic filter G I of such forcing notions is always determined by a canonical generic realη I . How does nep and creature forcing fit into this framework?
• According to the Rule of Thumb 3.1, most P I which can be shown to be proper, are in fact nep. But we do not know of any particular theorems or counterexamples.
• In particular, we do not know whether there is a good characterization of the (definable) ideals I such that P I is nep. (1) The generic filter G is determined by the generic realη.
(2) (P,η) is not equivalent to a forcing of the form (P I ,η I ).
To make this precise, we have to specify what we mean with "equivalent". We use the following version: In particular, this implies
We will need the following straightforward fact:
Lemma 3.14. Assume that (P,η) is equivalent to P I , and that there is a Borel function f such that Pη
Then the canonical map ϕ : P J → ro(P) defined by B → η ∈ B P is a dense embedding, where we set J = {B :
Proof. Given p ∈ P, we need some B such that 0 η ∈ B ≤ p. Let q,B, q be as in (3.10), and set B = f −1B . In particularB
A density argument together with [Zap08, 3.3 .2] gives the following:
Lemma 3.15. Assume that P is ω ω bounding and has Borel reading of names with respect to the P-nameη and that (P,η) is equivalent to P I . Fix p 0 ∈ P. Then there is a p 1 ≤ p 0 such that P ′ = {p ∈ P : p ≤ p 1 } satisfies the following: For all p there is a compact set C such that 0 η
Borel reading means: For all P-namesr for a real and all p ∈ P there is a Borel function f and a q ≤ p forcing thatr = f (η).
Note that the forcing of Subsection 3.2 has Borel reading (even continuous reading) of names from the canonical genericη.
Proof. Given p 0 ∈ P, there is some p 1 ≤ p and f Borel such that p 1 forcesη ′ I to be f (η). So according to Lemma 3.14, the canonical embedding ϕ : P J → ro(P ′ ) is dense for
Proof of 3.12. Proof of (1).
We will use the following property of norms, cf. Definition 3.4:
(3.11) For norms φ 0 , φ 1 with val(φ 0 ) ∩ val(φ 1 ) ∅ there is a weakest norm φ 0 ∧ φ 1 stronger than both φ 0 and φ 1 .
Proof: We define ψ = φ 0 ∧ φ 1 the following way: val(ψ) = val(φ 0 ) ∩ val(φ 1 ) and ψ(b) is defined by induction on the cardinality of b:
We have to show that ψ is a norm: Bigness follows imediately from the definition. It remains to show monotonicity. We show by induction on b: On the other hand it is clear that ψ is the biggest possible norm that is smaller than φ 0 and φ 1 . So we get (3.11).
We will also need: ). This shows (3.12). For compatible p, q ∈ P we can define p ∧ q by (p ∧ q)(i) = p(i) ∧ q(i). This is the weakest condition stronger than both p and q. An immediate consequence of (3.11) is: p ⊥ q is equivalent to
An obvious candidate for reconstructing the generic filter G from the generic realη (that works with many tree-like forcings) would be the set
However, due to the halving property of P, this fails miserably: There are incompatible conditions q and r with val(q(n)) = val(r(n)) for all n. More specifically, we get the following: For all p there is an r ≤ p such that (3.14)
r ⊥ half(p), and val(r(n)) ⊆ val(half(p)(n)) for all n.
Proof: Set q(n) = half(p). Pick for all sufficiently large n some a n ⊆ val(q(n)) such that q(n)(a n ) = 2. Using the halving property, we can find for all n some φ n ≤ p(n) such that val(φ n ) ⊆ a n and nor(φ n ) > nor(p(n))/2. Set r = (φ n ) n∈ω . Then r and q cannot be compatible, since q(n)(val(r(n))) is bounded. This shows (3.14).
Back to the proof. First note the following: Fix p ∈ P. Let X(p) be the set of all sequencesb = (b n ) n∈d where d is an infinite subset of ω and b n ⊆ val(p(n)) such that { k * n p(n)(b n ) : n ∈ d} is bounded. Fix someb ∈ X(b). Then p forces thatη is not in the set
Proof: Assume towards a contradiction that some p
, a contradiction. This shows (3.15). We claim that the following defines G:
, so it is enough to show that all p 1 , p 2 ∈ H are compatible. Set b n = val(p 1 (n)) ∩ val(p 2 (n)). Note that b n is nonempty, since p 1 , p 2 ∈ H 0 . So according to (3.13) we can assume towards a contradiction that the following holds (in V):
According to (3.12), we get c Proof of (2). Let us assume towards a contradiction that P is equivalent to P I . So it satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.15. Fix p ∈ P ′ , and set q = half(p). Let C be compact such that
Then n∈ω val(q(n)) ⊆ C, since C is closed. Let r ≤ p be incompatible to q such that val(r(n)) ⊆ val(q(n)) as in (3.14). Then n∈ω val(r(n)) ⊆ C, therefore r η ∈ C. So r ≤ * q by (3.17), which contradicts r ⊥ q.
3.6. Counterexamples. Being nep is a property of the definition, not the forcing. Of course we can find for any given proper forcing a definition which is not nep (take any definition that is not upwards absolute). For the same trivial reasons, a forcing "absolutely equivalent" to a nep forcing doesn't have to be nep itself. For example:
Example 3.16. There are upward absolute definitions of (trivial) forcings P, Q s.t. in V and all candidates, P is a dense suborder of Q, P is nep but Q is not nep.
Proof. Pick p ∈ L ∩ 2 ω and a candidate M 0 that thinks p L. Define P = {1, p 1 , p 2 }, x ≤ P y iff y = 1 or x = y. Set Q = P ∪ {q 1 , q 2 } and define the order on Q by: 1 ≤ q i ≤ p i , and if p ∈ L, then also p 2 ≤ q 1 and p 1 ≤ q 2 . These definitions are upwards absolute and P is nep. However, M 0 "q 1 ⊥ q 2 ". But every Q-generic Filter over V contains q 1 and q 2 , so there cannot be a Q-generic condition over M 0 .
If Q, ≤ and ⊥ are Σ 1 1 and Q is ccc, then Q is Suslin ccc, and therefore (transitive) nep. (One of the reasons is that in the Σ 1 1 -case it is absolute for countable antichains to be maximal.) This is not true anymore if the definition of Q is just Σ 1 2 : Example 3.17. Let Q be random forcing in L ordered by inclusion, i.e., Q = {r ∈ L : r is a Borel-code for a non-null-set}.
Then p ∈ Q is Σ 1 2 and q ≤ p and p ⊥ q are (relatively) Borel, and in V and all candidates Q is ccc. But Q is not nep.
Proof. Pick in L a (transitive) candidate M such that M thinks that ω L 1 (and therefore Q) is countable. In particular there is for each n ∈ ω a maximal antichain A n in M such that µ(X n ) < 1/n for X n = a∈A n a. (Of course M thinks that X n is not in L. But really it is, simply because M ⊆ L.) Take any q ∈ Q V , and pick n such that 1/n < µ(q). Then q ′ = q\ X n is positive and in L, and a generic filter containing q ′ does not meet the antichain A n .
It is however not clear whether Q could not have another definition that is nep, or at least whether Q is forcing-equivalent to a nep forcing. If L is very small (or very large) in V, then Q is Cohen (or random, respectively) and thus equivalent to a nep forcing notion. If V ′ is an extension of V = L by a random real, then in V ′ the forcing Q (which is "random forcing in L") seems to be more complicated (it adds an unbounded real, but no Cohen). We do not know whether in this case Q is equivalent to a nep forcing.
Countable support iterations
This section consists of three subsections: 4.1 We introduce the basic notation and preservation theorem. We get generic conditions for the limit, but not an upwards absolute definition of the forcing notion. 4.2 We introduce an equivalent definition of the iteration which is upwards absolute.
So the limit is again nep. 4.3 We modify the notions of Subsection 4.1 to subsets of the ordinals, and give a nice application. For this section, we fix a sequence (Q α ) α∈ǫ of forcing-definitions and a nep-parameter p coding the parameters (p α ) α∈ǫ , i.e., p is a nep-parameter with domain ǫ and p(α) is the nepparameter used to define Q α for each α ∈ ǫ. (So we assume that the sequence of defining formulas and parameters live in the ground model.)
To further simplify notation, we also assume that candidates are successor-absolute, i.e., "α is successor" and the function α → α + 1 are absolute for all candidates.
Remark 4.1. This assumption is not really necessary. Without it, we just have to use "M thinks that α = ζ + 1" instead of just "α = ζ + 1" in the definition of G M α etc., similarly to 4.20. Also, we assume the following (which could be replaced by weaker conditions, but is satisfied in practice anyway):
• In every forcing extension of V, each Q α is normal nep (for ZFC * candidates).
• We only start constructions with candidates M such that generic extensions M [G] satisfy ZFC * . Definition 4.2. Let M be a candidate.
• P β is the countable support iteration (in other terminology: the limit of) (P α , Q α ) α∈β (for all β ≤ ǫ). We use G α to denote the P α -generic filter over V, and G(α) for the Q α -generic filter over V[P α ].
• P M β is the element of M so that M thinks: P M β is the countable support iteration of the sequence (Q α ) α∈β (for β ∈ ǫ ∩ M).
In certain P ǫ -extensions of V the generic filter G defines a canonical P M ǫ -generic G M ǫ over M: 13 Formally we can require that M satisfies some stronger ZFC ′ and that ZFC ′ proves that every formula of ZFC * is forced by all countable support iterations of forcings of the form Q α . Also, we assume that ZFC proves that H(χ) satisfies ZFC * for sufficiently large regular χ, and that ZFC proves that the defining formulas are absolute between V and H(χ). Definition 4.3. Given G ⊂ P ǫ , we define G We will interpret (M, σ, p) as the "canonical M-generic condition forcing that p ∈ G M α ". (Generally there are many generic conditions, and incompatible ones, so we have to single out a specific one, the canonical generic, and for this we need 4.13).
Recall the construction of gen from Definition/Lemma 4.10. If we use Assumption 4.13, we get: (Here, gen N is the result of the construction 4.10 carried out inside N, and analogously for V.) Of course gen cannot really be upwards absolute (i.e., we cannot have gen N (M, σ, p) = gen V (M, σ, p)), since x ∈ P α is not upwards absolute. However, (2) gives us a sufficient amount of absoluteness.
Proof.
(1) is clear. For (2), just go through the construction of 4.10 again and check by induction that this construction is really sufficiently "canonical", i.e., absolute.
If σ 1 σ 2 both enumerate M, then we do not require gen(M, σ 1 , p) and gen(M, σ 2 , p) to be compatible.
Let us first note that a function gen as above also satisfies the following: 
